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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-538
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FORSYTH COUNTY, GEORGIA, PETITIONER v.
THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eleventh circuit
[June 19, 1992]

  Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In this case, with its emotional overtones, we must decide
whether the free speech guarantees of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments are violated by an assembly and
parade ordinance that permits a government administrator
to vary the fee for assembling or parading to reflect the
estimated cost of maintaining public order.
                      I
  Petitioner Forsyth County is a primarily rural Georgia
county approximately 30 miles northeast of Atlanta.  It has
had a troubled racial history.  In 1912, in one month, its
entire African-American population, over 1000 citizens, was
driven systematically from the county in the wake of the
rape and murder of a white woman and the lynching of her
accused assailant.  Seventy-five years later, in 1987, the
county population remained 99% white.
  Spurred by this history, Hosea Williams, an Atlanta city
councilman and civil rights personality, proposed a Forsyth
County -March Against Fear and Intimidation- for January
17, 1987.  Approximately 90 civil rights demonstrators
attempted to parade in Cumming, the county seat.  The
marchers were met by members of the Forsyth County
Defense League (an independent affiliate of respondent, The
Nationalist Movement), of the Ku Klux Klan, and other
Cumming residents.  In all, some 400 counter-demonstra-
tors lined the parade route, shouting racial slurs.  Eventu-
ally, the counter-demonstrators, dramatically outnumbering
police officers, forced the parade to a premature halt by
throwing rocks and beer bottles.
  Williams planned a return march the following weekend.
It developed into the largest civil rights demonstration in
the South since the 1960s.  On January 24, approximately
20,000 marchers joined civil rights leaders, United States
Senators, presidential candidates, and an Assistant United
States Attorney General in a parade and rally.  The 1,000
counter-demonstrators on the parade route were contained
by more than 3,000 state and local police and National
Guardsmen.  Although there was sporadic rock-throwing
and 60 counter-demonstrators were arrested, the parade
was not interrupted.  The demonstration cost over $670,000
in police protection, of which Forsyth County apparently
paid a small portion.  See App. to Pet. for Cert. 75-94;
L.A. Times, Jan. 28, 1987, Metro section, p. 5, col. 1.
  -As a direct result- of these two demonstrations, the
Forsyth County Board of Commissioners enacted Ordinance
34 on January 27, 1987.  See Brief for Petitioner 6.  The
ordinance recites that it is -to provide for the issuance of
permits for parades, assemblies, demonstrations, road
closings, and other uses of public property and roads by
private organizations and groups of private persons for
private purposes.-  See App. to Pet. for Cert. 98.  The Board
of Commissioners justified the ordinance by explaining that
-the cost of necessary and reasonable protection of persons
participating in or observing said parades, assemblies,
demonstrations, road closings and other related activities
exceeds the usual and normal cost of law enforcement for
which those participating should be held accountable and
responsible.-  Id., at 100.  The ordinance required the
permit applicant to defray these costs by paying a fee, the
amount of which was to be fixed -from time to time- by the
Board.  Id., at 105.
  Ordinance 34 was amended on June 8, 1987, to provide
that every permit applicant -shall pay in advance for such
permit, for the use of the County, a sum not more than
$1000.00 for each day such parade, procession, or open air
public meeting shall take place.-  Id., at 119.  In addition,
the county administrator was empowered to -adjust the
amount to be paid in order to meet the expense incident to
the administration of the Ordinance and to the mainte-
nance of public order in the matter licensed.-  Ibid.
  In January 1989, respondent The Nationalist Movement
proposed to demonstrate in opposition to the federal holiday
commemorating the birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr.  In
Forsyth County, the Movement sought to -conduct a rally
and speeches for one and a half to two hours- on the
courthouse steps on a Saturday afternoon.  Nationalist
Movement v. City of Cumming, 913 F. 2d 885, 887 (CA11
1990).  The county imposed a $100 fee.  The fee did not
include any calculation for expenses incurred by law
enforcement authorities, but was based on 10 hours of the
county administrator's time in issuing the permit.  The
county administrator testified that the cost of his time was
deliberately undervalued and that he did not charge for the
clerical support involved in processing the application.  Tr.
135-139.
  The Movement did not pay the fee and did not hold the
rally.  Instead, it instituted this action on January 19, 1989,
in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, requesting a temporary restraining
order and permanent injunction prohibiting Forsyth County
from interfering with the Movement's plans.
  The District Court denied the temporary restraining
order and injunction.  It found that, although -the instant
ordinance vests much discretion in the County Administra-
tor in determining an appropriate fee,- the determination
of the fee was -based solely upon content-neutral criteria;
namely, the actual costs incurred investigating and process-
ing the application.-  App. to Pet. for Cert. 13-14.  Although
it expressed doubt about the constitutionality of that
portion of the ordinance that permits fees to be based upon
the costs incident to maintaining public order, the District
Court found that -the county ordinance, as applied in this
case, is not unconstitutional.- Id., at 14.
  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reversed this aspect of the District Court's judg-
ment.  Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming, 913 F. 2d
885 (1990).  Relying on its prior opinion in Central Florida
Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F. 2d 1515, 1521
(CA11 1985), cert. denied, 475 U. S. 1120 (1986), the Court
of Appeals held: -An ordinance which charges more than a
nominal fee for using public forums for public issue speech,
violates the First Amendment.-  913 F. 2d, at 891 (internal
quotations omitted).  The court determined that a permit
fee of up to $1000 a day exceeded this constitutional
threshold.  Ibid.  One judge concurred specially, calling for
Central Florida to be overruled.  Id., at 896.
  The Court of Appeals then voted to vacate the panel's
opinion and to rehear the case en banc.  921 F. 2d 1125
(1990).  After further briefing, the court issued a per curiam
opinion reinstating the panel opinion in its entirety.  934 F.
2d 1482, 1483 (1991).  Two judges, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, agreed that any fee imposed on the
exercise of First Amendment rights in a traditional public
forum must be nominal if it is to survive constitutional
scrutiny.  Those judges, however, did not believe that the
county ordinance swept so broadly that it was facially
invalid, and would have remanded the case for the District
Court to determine whether the fee was nominal.  Id., at
1483.  Three judges dissented, arguing that this Court's
cases do not require that fees be nominal.  Id., at 1493.
  We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the
Courts of Appeals concerning the constitutionality of
charging a fee for a speaker in a public forum.  ____
U. S.____ (1992).
                     II
  Respondent mounts a facial challenge to the Forsyth
County ordinance.  It is well established that in the area of
freedom of expression an overbroad regulation may be
subject to facial review and invalidation, even though its
application in the case under consideration may be constitu-
tionally unobjectionable.  See, e.g., City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 798-799,
and n. 15 (1984); Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles
v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S. 569, 574 (1987).  This
exception from general standing rules is based on an
appreciation that the very existence of some broadly written
laws has the potential to chill the expressive activity of
others not before the court.  See, e.g., New York v. Ferber,
458 U. S. 747, 772 (1982); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,
472 U. S. 491, 503 (1985).  Thus, the Court has permitted
a party to challenge an ordinance under the overbreadth
doctrine in cases where every application creates an
impermissible risk of suppression of ideas, such as an
ordinance that delegates overly broad discretion to the
decisionmaker, see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97
(1940); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 56 (1965);
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S., at 798, n. 15, and in cases
where the ordinance sweeps too broadly, penalizing a
substantial amount of speech that is constitutionally
protected.  See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601
(1973); Jews for Jesus, 482 U. S., at 574-575.
  The Forsyth County ordinance requiring a permit and a
fee before authorizing public speaking, parades, or assem-
blies in -the archetype of a traditional public forum,- Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 480 (1988), is a prior restraint on
speech.  See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147,
150-151 (1969); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 271
(1951).  Although there is a -heavy presumption- against
the validity of a prior restraint, Bantam Books, Inc v.
Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 (1963), the Court has recognized
that government, in order to regulate competing uses of
public forums, may impose a permit requirement on those
wishing to hold a march, parade, or rally.  See Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 574-576 (1941).  Such a scheme,
however, must meet certain constitutional requirements.
It may not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a
government official.  See Freedman v. Maryland, supra.
Further, any permit scheme controlling the time, place, and
manner of speech must not be based on the content of the
message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and must leave open ample alterna-
tives for communication.  See United States v. Grace, 461
U. S. 171, 177 (1983).
                      A
  Respondent contends that the county ordinance is facially
invalid because it does not prescribe adequate standards for
the administrator to apply when he sets a permit fee.  A
government regulation that allows arbitrary application is
-inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and
manner regulation because such discretion has the potential
for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of
view.-  Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 649 (1981).  To curtail that
risk, -a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms to the prior restraint of a license- must contain
-narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the
licensing authority.-  Shuttlesworth, 394 U. S., at 150-151;
see also Niemotko, 340 U. S., at 271.  The reasoning is
simple: If the permit scheme -involves appraisal of facts,
the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion,-
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 305 (1940), by the
licensing authority, -the danger of censorship and of
abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is
too great- to be permitted.  Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 553 (1975).
  In evaluating petitioner's facial challenge, we must
consider the county's authoritative constructions of the
ordinance, including its own implementation and interpre-
tation of it.  See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S.
781, 795-796 (1989); Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing
Co., 486 U. S. 750, 770, n. 11 (1988); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U. S. 518, 524-528 (1972).  In the present litigation, the
county has made clear how it interprets and implements
the ordinance.  The ordinance can apply to any activity on
public property--from parades, to street corner speeches,
to bike races--and the fee assessed may reflect the county's
police and administrative costs.  Whether or not, in any
given instance, the fee would include any or all of the
county's administrative and security expenses is decided by
the county administrator.
  In this case, according to testimony at the District Court
hearing, the administrator based the fee on his own
judgment of what would be reasonable.  Although the
county paid for clerical support and staff as an -expense
incident to the administration- of the permit, the adminis-
trator testified that he chose in this instance not to include
that expense in the fee.  The administrator also attested
that he had deliberately kept the fee low by undervaluing
the cost of the time he spent processing the application.
Even if he had spent more time on the project, he claimed,
he would not have charged more.  He further testified that,
in this instance, he chose not to include any charge for
expected security expense.  Tr. 135-139.
  The administrator also explained that the county had
imposed a fee pursuant to a permit on two prior occasions.
The year before, the administrator had assessed a fee of
$100 for a permit for the Movement.  The administrator
testified that he charged the same fee the following year
(the year in question here), although he did not state that
the Movement was seeking the same use of county property
or that it required the same amount of administrative time
to process.  Id., at 138.  The administrator also once
charged bike-race organizers $25 to hold a race on county
roads, but he did not explain why processing a bike-race
permit demanded less administrative time than processing
a parade permit or why he had chosen to assess $25 in that
instance.  Id., at 143-144.  At oral argument in this Court,
counsel for Forsyth County stated that the administrator
had levied a $5 fee on the Girl Scouts for an activity on
county property.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 26.  Finally, the adminis-
trator testified that in other cases the county required
neither a permit nor a fee for activities in other county
facilities or on county land.  Tr. 146.
  Based on the county's implementation and construction
of the ordinance, it simply cannot be said that there are any
-narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards,-
Niemotko, 340 U. S., at 271, guiding the hand of the
Forsyth County administrator.  The decision how much to
charge for police protection or administrative time-or even
whether to charge at all-is left to the whim of the adminis-
trator.  There are no articulated standards either in the
ordinance or in the county's established practice.  The
administrator is not required to rely on any objective
factors.  He need not provide any explanation for his
decision, and that decision is unreviewable.  Nothing in the
law or its application prevents the official from encouraging
some views and discouraging others through the arbitrary
application of fees.  The First Amendment prohibits the
vesting of such unbridled discretion in a government
official.
                      B
  The Forsyth County ordinance contains more than the
possibility of censorship through uncontrolled discretion.
As construed by the county, the ordinance often requires
that the fee be based on the content of the speech.
  The county envisions that the administrator, in appropri-
ate instances, will assess a fee to cover -the cost of neces-
sary and reasonable protection of persons participating in
or observing said . . . activit[y].-  See App. to Pet. for Cert.
100.  In order to assess accurately the cost of security for
parade participants, the administrator -`must necessarily
examine the content of the message that is conveyed,'-
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221,
230 (1987), quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of
California, 468 U. S. 364, 383 (1984), estimate the response
of others to that content, and judge the number of police
necessary to meet that response.  The fee assessed will
depend on the administrator's measure of the amount of
hostility likely to be created by the speech based on its
content.  Those wishing to express views unpopular with
bottle-throwers, for example, may have to pay more for
their permit.
  Although petitioner agrees that the cost of policing
relates to content, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 15 and 24, it con-
tends that the ordinance is content-neutral because it is
aimed only at a secondary effect-the cost of maintaining
public order.  It is clear, however, that, in this case, it
cannot be said that the fee's justification -`ha[s] nothing to
do with content.'-  Ward, 491 U. S., at 792, quoting Boos v.
Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 320 (1988) (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
  The costs to which petitioner refers are those associated
with the public's reaction to the speech.  Listeners' reaction
to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.  See
Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S., at 321 (opinion of O'Connor, J.);
id., at 334 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 55-56 (1988); Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U. S. 105, 116 (1943); cf. Schneider v. State, 308
U. S. 147, 162 (1939) (fact that city is financially burdened
when listeners throw leaflets on the street does not justify
restriction on distribution of leaflets).  Speech cannot be
financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or
banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.
See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949).
  This Court has held time and again: -Regulations which
permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the
content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First
Amendment.-  Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U. S. 641, 648-649
(1984); Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U. S., at  ___ (slip op.
9); Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U. S., at 230.  The county
offers only one justification for this ordinance: raising
revenue for police services.  While this undoubtedly is an
important government responsibility, it does not justify a
content-based permit fee.  See Arkansas Writers' Project,
481 U. S., at 229-231.
  Petitioner insists that its ordinance cannot be unconstitu-
tionally content-based because it contains much of the same
language as did the state statute upheld in Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941).  Although the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire had interpreted the statute at
issue in Cox to authorize the municipality to charge a
permit fee for the -maintenance of public order,- no fee was
actually assessed.  See id., at 577.  Nothing in this Court's
opinion suggests that the statute, as interpreted by the
New Hampshire Supreme Court, called for charging a
premium in the case of a controversial political message
delivered before a hostile audience.  In light of the Court's
subsequent First Amendment jurisprudence, we do not read
Cox to permit such a premium.
                      C
  Petitioner, as well as the Court of Appeals and the
District Court, all rely on the maximum allowable fee as
the touchstone of constitutionality.  Petitioner contends that
the $1,000 cap on the fee ensures that the ordinance will
not result in content-based discrimination.  The ordinance
was found unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals because
the $1,000 cap was not sufficiently low to be -nominal.-
Neither the $1,000 cap on the fee charged, nor even some
lower nominal cap, could save the ordinance because in this
context, the level of the fee is irrelevant.  A tax based on
the content of speech does not become more constitutional
because it is a small tax.
  The lower courts derived their requirement that the
permit fee be -nominal- from a sentence in the opinion in
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943).  In
Murdock, the Court invalidated a flat license fee levied on
distributors of religious literature.  In distinguishing the
case from Cox, where the Court upheld a permit fee, the
Court stated: -And the fee is not a nominal one, imposed as
a regulatory measure and calculated to defray the expense
of protecting those on the streets and at home against the
abuses of solicitors.-  319 U. S., at 116.  This sentence does
not mean that an invalid fee can be saved if it is nominal,
or that only nominal charges are constitutionally permissi-
ble.  It reflects merely one distinction between the facts in
Murdock and those in Cox.
  The tax at issue in Murdock was invalid because it was
unrelated to any legitimate state interest, not because it
was of a particular size.  Similarly, the provision of the
Forsyth County ordinance relating to fees is invalid because
it unconstitutionally ties the amount of the fee to the
content of the speech and lacks adequate procedural
safeguards; no limit on such a fee can remedy these
constitutional violations.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

                          It is so ordered.